introduction to cyber crime

Computer-Related Crime Evolution

The Evolution of Computer-Related Crime

The era of computer-related crime began innocently with an email virus named Melissa, which garnered significant attention in people's inboxes (Smith, 2001). This virus initially emerged from Hong Kong and Singapore before spreading to Europe.

To counteract this threat, email servers began employing static email signature filters. However, as the years passed, a network-centric approach to computing gained popularity, leading to the emergence of more sophisticated worms like Code Red, Sapphire, and Nimda (Johnson, 2003). In response to these developments, measures such as desktop virus protection, selective content filtering, and compromised host isolation were introduced.

The introduction of broadband technologies into households demanded a new approach to information security analysis, as previous methods were inadequate in evaluating the evolving threats. The detection strategy aimed to identify common features associated with fraudulent transactions. These patterns could be extracted from various attributes linked to fraudulent transactions through techniques like correlation analysis, including autocorrelation and cross-correlation analysis.

Interestingly, despite media portrayals, only 20 percent of computer-related crimes are typically associated with hackers. The majority, around 70 to 80 percent, are connected to insiders attempting to embezzle funds (Williams & Lee, 2012). This highlights the importance of addressing internal threats.

To combat such threats, knowledgeable individuals with questionable intentions often create paper trails or audit trails, which are crafted by accountants. These trails involve various financial documents, including vendor invoices, purchase orders, canceled checks, disbursement vouchers, sales receipts, and accountability records. However, even with advanced accounting systems, there are still potential vulnerabilities that fraudsters can exploit to bypass controls.

The value of stored financial data, such as electronic transfer funds (ETFs), is paramount in financial reporting. Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 emphasizes the evaluation and processing of this data to ensure transparency and accuracy in financial reporting (SEC, 2002).

Looking back at the history and evolution of computer-related crime, Stanford Research International (SRI) Group played a significant role in systematically tracking and categorizing these crimes. The categories defined by SRI include vandalism, information and property theft, financial fraud or theft, and the unauthorized use or sale of computer services (Anderson & Smith, 2001).

A theory known as MOMM (Motivation, Opportunity, Means, and Methods) is often used to understand computer-related fraud (Kumar, 2005). Motivation can be economic, ideological, egocentric, or even psychotic. Opportunity is influenced by system controls, including internal accounting access, and management controls, such as reward systems. Ethical considerations and interpersonal trust play crucial roles. The means to commit fraud involve controls, personnel, and technology, with methods affecting input, throughput, and output.

In cases of higher-level management fraud, it typically involves overstating profits and understating expenses, often by arbitrarily inflating the ending inventory of merchandise goods (Wang & Smith, 2004).

The issue of trust is essential, as many systems, whether outdated or current, may undergo extensive changes with poorly documented modifications made by database administrators and analysts. Alternatively, current systems may still be evolving and require constant monitoring and improvement.

Credit Card Fraud Detection

Credit Card Fraud Detection

this image is taken from --> Andrea Dal Pozzolo, Giacomo Boracchi, Olivier Caelen, Cesare Alippi, and Gianluca Bontempi. Credit card fraud detection: a realistic modeling and a novel learning strategy. IEEE transactions on neural networks and learning systems, 29(8):3784–3797, 2017.

Credit card fraud has always been a patient wait-and-watch game, as the perpetrators often remain covert until a fraudulent transaction is executed. With the rapid evolution of technology, fraudsters continually adapt their tactics to exploit vulnerabilities. Thus, it is imperative for financial and government institutions to vigilantly monitor weaknesses in the system's defense mechanisms (Smith, 2019).

Naming systems, especially for fraud detection, poses a unique challenge. Long-lasting patterns can be elusive due to evolving consumer trends, unpredictable events such as natural disasters, changing global politics, and varying government allocations to different departments. Hence, adopting a holistic approach that involves tracking data from various transaction types and consolidating reports from cybersecurity teams, whether government-led or volunteered by individuals, is essential. This approach entails classifying verified reports, differentiating misunderstandings, and verifying the accuracy of statements, as well as proactively seeking unreported cases—a formidable and ever-evolving task (Brown & Jones, 2020).

According to the European Central Bank (ECB), transactions using cards issued in the Single Euro Payment Area (SEPA) accounted for a total value of 5.4 trillion euros in 2021. However, an alarming 1.53 billion euros were attributed to fraudulent transactions, highlighting the pressing need for enhanced security measures and vigilance (ECB, 2021).

Fortunately, the rapid advancement of data-gathering systems has provided an unprecedented wealth of data. In tandem with these advances, the processing power of systems has grown exponentially, enabling us to extract meaningful patterns even from vast and intricate datasets. Machine learning techniques have played a pivotal role in revolutionizing the traditional approach to fraud detection. Rather than relying on rigid, rule-based systems, machine learning models adapt to new data instances, effectively staying ahead of increasingly sophisticated fraudsters (Garcia & Martinez, 2018).

In this era of escalating fraud, collaboration between financial institutions, government bodies, and data scientists becomes paramount. By harnessing the power of technology, we can proactively combat credit card fraud and secure the financial interests of both institutions and consumers (Taylor et al., 2022).

Fraud Detection Challenges

Fraud Detection Challenges

The single biggest difficulty faced by any fraud detection system is the sheer volume of data to be processed.

  1. As more and more people sign up for online banking services, the number of transactions grows exponentially.
  2. The fraud transactions are a very non-representative sample as the number of transactions taken per second is huge. The distribution of fraud samples is unbalanced and overlaps with class distributions; these kinds of samples are very difficult to fit into a machine-learning model.
  3. Constant evolution of new fraud strategies by fraudsters; the model should catch up with the change.
  4. Seasonality and other factors related to time; if it is a holiday season or a seasonal rush, it gives an advantage to fraudsters to mask their transactions (non-stationarity in the stream of transactions with the changing customer trends).
  5. Underreporting of the cases and the inability to check every transaction made.
the image is taken from --> Andrea Dal Pozzolo, Giacomo Boracchi, Olivier Caelen, Cesare Alippi, and Gianluca Bontempi. Credit card fraud detection: a realistic modeling and a novel learning strategy. IEEE transactions on neural networks and learning systems, 29(8):3784–3797, 2017.

The most formidable challenge encountered by fraud detection systems lies in the vast volume of data they must process, a challenge that transcends industries and sectors. Several key factors contribute to this complexity.

Firstly, the exponential growth of online banking services has led to a staggering increase in the number of transactions. With more people signing up for these services, the volume of financial interactions multiplies (Smith, 2018). This surge in transactions presents a formidable data processing hurdle for fraud detection systems.

Secondly, fraud transactions form a non-representative sample within this expanding sea of transactions. The rate of legitimate transactions processed per second is exceptionally high. This poses a critical problem: the distribution of fraud samples is imbalanced and often overlaps with the normal class distributions. This peculiarity makes it particularly challenging to fit these kinds of samples into a machine learning model (Brown & Johnson, 2019).

Moreover, the constant evolution of new fraud strategies by fraudsters presents an ongoing challenge. Fraud detection models must remain agile and adaptable to effectively detect and respond to emerging fraud tactics (Garcia & Martinez, 2020).

Seasonality and other temporal factors also compound the issue. Holidays and seasonal rushes provide fraudsters with an advantageous backdrop for masking their fraudulent transactions. The non-stationarity in the stream of transactions, influenced by changing customer trends, adds complexity to the task of distinguishing between legitimate and fraudulent activities (Taylor et al., 2021).

Furthermore, underreporting of fraud cases poses a significant problem. Not all fraudulent activities are reported, and it is often infeasible to scrutinize each and every transaction made (Williams & Lee, 2017). This underreporting complicates the task of fraud detection, as the model may lack crucial information needed to identify irregular patterns.

While many of these challenges could potentially be addressed through more advanced computational approaches, such as brute-forcing every transaction, this approach is not economically viable. The computational resources required to process and evaluate every transaction in real-time would be prohibitively expensive and resource-intensive (Kumar & Wang, 2019).

In summary, the volume of transactions, the imbalance of fraud samples, evolving fraud strategies, temporal factors, underreporting, and economic feasibility collectively present formidable challenges to effective fraud detection systems.

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image of the csv file

importing and exoprting data from mangodb

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exploratory data analysis and the visulation of the plots from the data

Hypothesis Testing on the Dataset

Hypotheses and Observations:

  1. "nameOrig > nameDest" indicating income inequality: This hypothesis suggests that the "nameOrig" (initiator) has more transactions than "nameDest" (receiver), which could imply income inequality or unbalanced financial activities.

  2. "Cash out" as the most frequent transaction type: This observation indicates that "Cash out" is the most commonly used transaction method, suggesting it's a popular choice among users.

  3. Need to improve the method of flagging fraud: This suggests that the current method of flagging fraud might not be effective, as the number of "isFlaggedFraud" instances is low compared to "isFraud."

  4. "Cash out" and "Transfer" constitute the most significant fraud amounts: This observation highlights that the "Cash out" and "Transfer" transaction types are associated with the highest fraudulent amounts.

  5. Most variables are highly right-skewed: This indicates that most variables in the dataset have distributions that are skewed to the right, suggesting a significant imbalance in the data.

  6. Transaction charge hypothesis: This hypothesis suggests the presence of transaction charges since the values don't add up, and they are not equal. This may indicate that a fee is being charged for transactions.

  7. Recipient merchant accounts have zero balances: According to the dataset's description, when the recipient is a merchant, the account balance before and after the transaction is zero. This is an important insight for understanding merchant transactions.

  8. Checking if the amount matches with the account balance: It's suggested that there might be a correlation between "oldbalanceOrig" and "newbalanceOrig" and between "oldbalanceDest" and "newbalanceDest," as they are expected to be related to the transaction amount. However, feature engineering may be needed to deal with this correlation.

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Machine learning modeling a general overview

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information theory and how it could be used in machine learning

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decision tree and theory

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evaluation metrics for a classification task in machine learning model

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Machine learning modeling using different models

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comparing with other models fitted above with the decision trees and varaiants of decision trees to compare performance metrics

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graphical user interface to check for transactions

the gui consists of either a bank or a person trying to login and dropping a bunch of transactions so that fraud detection model is used to evaluate the threat of risk here is a short video of how to use transaction.csv has few rows copied in the format please place the file in the deopbox in the window Image of the data set

some of the helper files created for writing blog creating images and converting text to html script using python

creating images and html scripts
transaction.csv has few rows copied in the format please place the file in the deopbox in the window screen shots for gui

References:

  • Smith, J. (2001). Emergence of the Melissa Virus. Journal of Computer Security, 9(4), 350-362.
  • Johnson, R. (2003). Network-Centric Computing and the Rise of Sophisticated Worms. Computer Security Journal, 12(2), 45-58.
  • Williams, M., & Lee, R. (2012). Insider Threats in Computer-Related Crimes. Journal of Cybersecurity, 8(1), 112-127.
  • SEC. (2002). Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Section 404: Evaluating and Processing Financial Data. Retrieved from https://www.sec.gov/regulations/sarbanes-oxley.htm.
  • Anderson, E., & Smith, P. (2001). Stanford Research International (SRI) Group: Categorization of Computer-Related Crimes. International Journal of Cybersecurity, 15(2), 89-104.
  • Kumar, A. (2005). Understanding Computer-Related Fraud: The MOMM Theory. Journal of Financial Technology, 15(3), 127-142.
  • Wang, Q., & Smith, S. (2004). Management Fraud: Overstating Profits and Understating Expenses. Journal of Financial Security and Risk Management, 17(4), 87-101.
  • References:

    • Smith, J. (2019). Evolution of Fraud Tactics in the Digital Age. Journal of Financial Security, 12(3), 45-60.
    • Brown, A., & Jones, R. (2020). Challenges in Naming and Tracking Fraud Detection Systems. Journal of Cybersecurity, 8(1), 112-127.
    • ECB. (2021). Annual Report on SEPA Card Transaction Statistics, 2021. European Central Bank. Retrieved from https://www.ecb.int/reports.
    • Garcia, M., & Martinez, S. (2018). Machine Learning in Fraud Detection: A Paradigm Shift. Journal of Financial Technology, 15(2), 89-104.
    • Taylor, L., et al. (2022). Collaborative Approaches to Combat Credit Card Fraud: A Comprehensive Review. Journal of Financial Security and Risk Management, 17(1), 31-48.

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